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Abstract
This article addresses under which circumstances migrants returning from European to (post-) 
conflict countries are willing and able to contribute to development and peace-building in 
their countries of origin. Based on comparative research in six countries world-wide and an 
in-depth study in Afghanistan, we explore (1) the heterogeneity of the post-return experience, 
(2) the complex meanings and motivations of return migration, and (3) the expectations of 
the characteristics of migrants, on which the link between return migration, development 
and peace-building is based. Based on these findings, we (4) explore return migrants’ 
potential to be agents of change. We find that while the expectations on which migration 
and development policies are based only count for a small minority of returnees, this is not 
the group that is targeted by policy. In order to formulate adequate policies that do address 
the needs and potential of returnees, we propose two modifications to current policy: First, 
de facto voluntary and involuntary return should be redefined into more relevant terms that 
cover the matter. Second, we propose to re-evaluate and disentangle the different goals that 
inform migration and development policies.
Keywords: return migration, migration and development policies, return motivation, 
embeddedness 
Introduction: The Rise of Return Migration as a 
Multi-Tool for Policy
‘When migrants return to their country of ori-
gin, they will contribute to development and 
peace building’. This optimistic mantra in cur-
rent European national policies (ICMPD and 
ECDPM 2013) is the result of a changing political 
discourse over the past 25 years with regard to 
migration. In this globalizing world, the interde-
pendency of development, security and mobility 
has become common ground. As a result, indus-
trialized host states have started to see modern 
migration movements as instruments for policy, 
which (1) need to be managed, controlled and 
regulated in order to (2) defend domestic secu-
rity and welfare and (3) promote international 
development and peace-building (Skeldon 2008; 
Raghuram 2009).
Efforts by host states to manage these three 
overlapping goals have led to the formulation 
of migration and development policies (see Fig-
ure 1). Within this policy domain, return migra-
tion evolved from being ‘the great unwritten 
chapter in the history of migration’ (King 2000: 7) 
to a multi-tool to encompass all these goals at 
once (see Skeldon 2008). Gradually, return migra-
tion came to be considered as both a movement 
back to normal that restores pre-conflict natu-
ral and social order as well as a movement for-
ward to change in which returnees contribute 
to development and peace-building (Koser and 
Black 1999; Faist 2008). 
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Although discussions on the link between 
migration and development globally have 
focused on successful economic migrants, coun-
tries throughout the European Union1 have 
expanded this link to also encompass the return 
of refugees, failed asylum seekers and undocu-
mented migrants (ICMPD and ECDPM 2013). In 
these European countries, asylum and immigra-
tion policies and so-called ‘Assisted Voluntary 
Return and Reintegration’ (AVRR) programmes 
have now taken up a substantial part, if not the 
bulk of, migration and development policies 
and budgets. These programmes are financed 
by, on average, three to nine per cent of Offi-
cial Development Assistance (ODA) (ibid). Other 
programmes that promote the link between 
return and development facilitate the tempo-
rary or circular return of high skilled migrants2 
(ibid). 
Although allowed by the ODA reporting system 
managed by the OECD, several scholars argue 
that ‘Assisted Voluntary Return’ programmes 
are heavily motivated by an interest to man-
age and control migration movements in a way 
that is financially and politically less costly than 
enforced removal. (Black and Gent 2006; Faist 
2008; Zimmermann 2012; ICMPD and ECDPM 
2013; Castles, De Haas and Miller 2014). Scholars 
wonder why and how some of the world’s most 
exploited people should contribute to develop-
ment where official aid programmes have failed 
(Castles and Miller 2009: 58). 
This article explores return migration within 
the migration-development-peace-building ne -
xus. We explore (1) the heterogeneity of the 
post-return experience, (2) the complex mean-
ings and motivations of return migration, and 
based on that, (3) interrogate the expectations 
of the characteristics of migrants, on which the 
link between return migration, development and 
1 Notably Belgium, France, the Netherlands and 
Spain. See ICMPD and ECDPM (2013) for a systematic 
analysis of 11 European countries’ Migration and De-
velopment policies and how it often includes Assisted 
Voluntary Return programs. 
2 Notably Belgium, France, Germany and the Nether-
lands (ICMPD and ECDPM 2013).
peace building is based. Based on these findings, 
we (4) explore return migrants’ potential to be 
agents of change. This exploration centres on the 
question of under which circumstances migrants 
returning from industrialized countries are will-
ing and able to contribute to change with regard 
to development and peace-building in the (post-) 
conflict country of origin. 
We explore these questions by focusing on the 
life courses of return migrants, while building on 
two methodologically complementary research 
phases. The first phase is a comparative study 
of 178 returnees from industrialized countries 
to six countries across the world (Sierra Leone, 
Togo, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghani-
stan and Vietnam) conducted in 2007-08. In 
each country, data was gathered through a struc-
tured survey, semi-structured interviews with 
returnees and key informants, and participatory 
observation. The study shows remarkable trends 
as well as context-specific differences. The sec-
ond phase builds on the first with an in-depth 
case study from 2012 among 35 Afghan return 
migrants who returned to their countries of ori-
gin. They mainly returned from Western Europe, 
and particularly from the Netherlands, the 
United Kingdom, Germany and Scandinavia. The 
autobiographical narrative was the core of the 
data collected, which helped to obtain a holistic 
understanding of the role of migration in indi-
viduals’ life courses. In addition, group discus-
sions and key informants helped to understand 
the complexities of return migration (Van Houte 
2014). 
After providing a brief historical background 
of the changes in political and social discourse 
during the past 25 years with regard to migra-
tion in general and return migration in particular, 
we present the main findings from these stud-
ies. They highlight that return neither is a move-
ment back to normal, nor is it easily a move-
ment forward to change. We find that the only 
returnees who could potentially contribute to 
change are voluntary returnees, which questions 
the adequacy of migration and development 
policies. 
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From Cold War Protection to Return Migrants 
as Agents of Change
Historically, three durable solutions to the ‘refu-
gee problem’ have been recognized: local inte-
gration in the host community, resettlement 
to so-called third countries (i.e. other than the 
country of origin and the original destination 
country), and repatriation to the country of ori-
gin. The end of the Cold War set in motion a 
number of changes in the industrialized states 
from the beginning of the 1990s onwards. These 
changes led to a gradually shifting discourse from 
integration to return as well as a shift from view-
ing migrants as victims of rival regimes to agents 
of change in their countries of origin. 
The first consequence of the end of the Cold 
War was an increasing reluctance to accommo-
date asylum seekers. Protecting refugees from 
rival regimes had previously been a powerful 
source of political propaganda and, at the same 
Figure 1. Return, development and peace-building goals, needs and policies
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time, the non-departure regime of the Iron Cur-
tain had kept refugee levels manageable. After 
the end of the Cold War, protecting refugees 
lost its geopolitical and ideological value for 
Western states. In addition, fading national and 
international boundaries, growing inequality 
and increased civil conflicts in the post-Cold War 
period caused increased numbers of refugees 
and asylum seekers to migrate (Castles, De Haas 
and Miller 2014).
Along with these increasing immigration 
flows, the notion emerged that large volumes 
of migrants might threaten the social cohesion, 
welfare and security in destination countries. 
This resulted in a growing public and political 
resistance in the industrialized states against 
immigration in the 1990s. The events of 11 Sep-
tember 2001, which linked migration to issues 
of security, conflict and terrorism, led to fur-
ther decreasing tolerance towards non-Western, 
Muslim and/or immigrant groups (Skeldon 2008; 
Raghuram 2009; Castles, De Haas and Miller 
2014: 226, 324). Finally, the interest in manag-
ing migration increased in the context of the eco-
nomic recession in Europe over the last five years 
(ICMPD and ECDPM 2013).
The perceived need of host countries to 
contain migration changed policies that were 
designed to welcome Cold War refugees into 
regimes meant to exclude unwanted or unpro-
ductive migrants (Duffield 2006; Castles, De Haas 
and Miller 2014: 226, 324). Obtaining refugee 
status became more difficult (Koser and Black 
1999; Black and Gent 2006) and the act of leav-
ing one’s home and seeking asylum was progres-
sively criminalized (Duffield 2006). New legis-
lation aimed at the eventual return of asylum 
seekers, such as temporary protection regimes 
instead of permanent refugee status (Castles, 
De Haas and Miller 2014: 226). 
A second trend after the collapse of the for-
mer superpower hegemony was a discourse 
change towards individualization, which also 
appeared in the field of migration, development 
and conflict. In migration policy, individualization 
meant that returning back ‘home’ after conflict 
to restore the natural and social order became 
portrayed as a basic human right. Since the 
early 1990s, the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other inter-
national bodies have promoted and facilitated 
return as the most desirable of all solutions for 
refugees (Hammond 1999; Omata 2013). In 
practice, however, a strong interest in returning 
unwanted migrants to their countries of origin 
led host countries to reject asylum seekers and 
pressure them to return much sooner than that 
the migrants themselves found feasible through 
financial inducements or with a threat of depor-
tation (Black and Gent 2006).
In the context of the growing significance of 
civil conflicts, the limited success of classic devel-
opment institutions and decreased budgets on 
aid and defence, the discourse of individualiza-
tion led to the search of alternative grassroots 
actors for development and peace building (Zun-
zer 2004; Duffield 2006). Governments and inter-
national agencies became attracted to ascribing 
migrants the moral responsibility for develop-
ment and peace-building in their places of ori-
gin3 (Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen 
2002; Faist 2008; Skeldon 2008; Raghuram 2009). 
Return Migration, Development and Peace 
Building
Without theoretical and empirical foundations, 
the discussion on the relationship between 
migration, development and peace-building risks 
being reduced to a merely political and ideologi-
cal issue (Raghuram 2009) that produces inade-
quate policies (Bakewell 2008). Scholars highlight 
the limited and contradictory evidence found in 
research as well as the complex and heteroge-
neous linkages between return, development 
and peace-building (Cassarino 2004; De Haas 
2010). The paradoxical expectations of return 
migration as both a movement back to normal 
3 Policies aimed at stimulating the link between 
migration and development usually contain elements 
promoting remittances, skilled migration, circular 
migration, the engagement of diasporas and return 
migration (Skeldon 2008, ICMPD and ECDPM 2013). 
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war to peace for different reasons. First, large-
scaled repatriation movements can stretch 
the resources in the society of return. Second, 
returnees may be associated with former eth-
nic and political (élite) structures. Third, distrust 
and resentment regarding questions of loyalty 
between returnees and those who stayed in the 
country can form a new line of conflict (Zunzer 
2004; Chan and Tran 2011). 
In addition to socio-political and economic 
challenges of return, a third line of research high-
lights the tension between return, identity, home 
and belonging. First, ‘home’ has changed as the 
post-war economic, social, cultural and politi-
cal situation in the society of origin is often very 
different from what people have left (Ghanem 
2003). Second, the notion of the homeland as 
a ‘purified space of belonging’ (Ahmed 1999) 
no longer fits in the experience of migrants who 
construct multiple and hybrid forms of belonging. 
In addition, protracted refugee situations lead to 
second-generation migrants who were born out-
side of the country of ‘origin’, which further com-
plicates notions of ‘home’ (Hammond 1999; Faist 
2008; Monsutti 2008; Raghuram 2009). Return 
migrants need to both negotiate belonging to 
the community of return as well as the distinc-
tiveness of their identity (Chan and Tran 2011).
The wealth of literature on the dynamic and 
multi-local notion of home and belonging sug-
gests ambiguity and variety as to what ‘home’ 
means; this concept needs to be taken into 
account in order to produce empirically and 
theoretically valid insights on return migration 
(Hammond 1999; Black and Gent 2006). 
Return as Change: Contributing to Human 
Capital and Peace or to Inequality and Conflict?
In contrast to the ‘restoring of order’ argument 
that implies the disappearance of differences 
between returnees and the local population, the 
‘return as change’ argument highlights the poten-
tial of such differences (King 1978; Bakewell 2008). 
First, as migration to industrialized countries is a 
privilege of a relatively wealthy minority, these 
migrants are considered as the higher educated, 
and a movement forward to change need to be 
explored (Koser and Black 1999; Faist 2008). In 
addition, an important question is which catego-
ries of returnees are expected to contribute to 
what kind of change. 
Return as Restoring Order: is Return Going 
Home? 
The argument that return means a restoring of 
natural and social order in the country of origin 
implies that when the initial reasons for migra-
tion have disappeared, return equals going 
‘home’ to the pre-conflict and pre-migration life. 
Return after conflict is seen as a means to undo 
the negative consequences of conflict, embod-
ied in refugee flows. The expectation of return as 
going ‘home’ has made reintegration a key issue 
on the international humanitarian agenda, which 
envisions the disappearance of ‘any observable 
distinctions which set returnees apart from their 
compatriots’ (UNHCR 1997: 9).
Despite the political and humanitarian logic, 
the academic debate is now beyond the point 
of seeing return as the end of the refugee cycle 
where everything goes back to normal. First, 
return is not necessarily the best option or 
the most logical move in the lives of migrants 
(Monsutti 2008; Omata 2013). Migrants’ deci-
sion to move is often part of dynamic life strate-
gies that aim to seek a better future in holistic 
terms, including security, but also political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural aspects. The financial, 
physical and emotional investments in migra-
tion imply that migrants have a lot to lose by 
going back, even if the conflict is settled and the 
country is considered safe. In addition, opportu-
nities or gains achieved in exile can be a factor 
that may delay (or deter) migrants’ decisions to 
return (Zimmermann 2012).
A second line of research highlights that rein-
tegration is not evident, as the post-conflict 
moment is a new phase in a dynamic and ongo-
ing process rather than a return to the pre-con-
flict situation (Hammond 1999; Cassarino 2004; 
Faist 2008). Return may increase tensions in the 
society of origin and hinder the transition from 
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wealthy, entrepreneurial and strongly networked 
élite. Second, they are expected to have acquired 
skills, capital and ideas while abroad. Third, they 
are believed to adopt an in-between position 
between the host country and the country of ori-
gin, which enables them to mediate between cul-
tures and negotiate change (King 1978; Sørensen, 
Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen 2002).
Despite these specific expectations on the 
characteristics of returned migrants as agents of 
change, a number of gaps remain insufficiently 
explored (Raghuram 2009). First, the increasing 
significance and benefits of mobility and access 
to transnational circuits makes inequalities 
with regard to the right or capacity to migrate 
an important dimension of social stratification 
(Carling 2002; Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-
Pedersen 2002; Faist 2008; King 2012). Such 
increased socio-economic differences caused by 
migration can induce conflict rather than con-
tribute to stability (Zunzer 2004). The study of 
migrants’ contribution to development should 
therefore recognize the hierarchization of peo-
ples’ right to migrate (Castles, De Haas and Miller 
2014: 75-76).
A second knowledge gap is that there is lim-
ited and contradictory evidence on the extent to 
which migrants are willing and able to change 
existing (social, cultural, economic or institu-
tional) structures in the country of origin. If they 
have gained new ideas for development and 
peace-building, how can they negotiate these 
changes within the society of return (Faist 2008)? 
Will their in-between position make them rela-
tively independent from the constraints of struc-
tures (Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Peder-
sen 2002)? Can they overcome the institutional 
constraints to which they themselves are subject, 
or is change only possible within an enabling 
institutional and economic framework (Castles, 
De Haas and Miller 2014: 78)?
Third, migration-development-peace-build-
ing policies do not only assume the ability of 
migrants to contribute to change, but they also 
have specific, yet under-defined expectations on 
the type and direction of such change (Bakewell 
2008; Faist 2008; Raghuram 2009). Implicitly, 
the notion of change is tied to socio-economic 
modernization in which migrants insert innova-
tion, a sense of progress, justice, democracy and 
human rights into the society of return (King 
1978; Raghuram 2009). In addition, change is 
expected to take place within existing (political) 
frameworks. Power shifts, political unrest, reli-
gious-based opposition and illegal activities are 
not the kind of change policy makers are hoping 
for. Especially since the events of 11 September 
2001, and recent news of young Muslims travel-
ing from Europe to Syria and Iraq to join Jihad-
ist movements, there is a heightened awareness 
that migrants may also contribute to the ‘wrong’ 
kind of change (Raghuram 2009; Castles, De Haas 
and Miller 2014: 79). The idea that migrants’ 
actions can and should be directed raises ethical 
and practical questions (Raghuram 2009). 
What Kind of Returnees? Meanings and 
Motivations of Mobility 
The tension in return as a movement back to 
normal versus a movement forward to change 
touches upon more fundamental questions about 
the meaning of mobility in the lives of migrants. 
The perception of return as going back to normal 
conceptualizes mobility as a disruption of life, 
with migrants as the victims of this disruption, 
while return is considered to restore a ‘normal’, 
sedentary life (Bakewell 2008). In contrast, the 
perception of return as change comes forward 
from the expectation that migrants increasingly 
benefit from their ‘hyperglobal’ (Carling 2002) 
and ‘hypermobile’ (King 2012) lives. 
Although this understanding of migrants as 
either victims or agents informs dichotomies 
between voluntary and forced migration, the real-
ity is more complex and heterogeneous. Scholars 
highlight that the motivations and meanings of 
migration and return are the outcome of a mix of 
migrants’ choices and constraints to stay or move 
(King 1978; Cassarino 2004; Bakewell 2008; Mon-
sutti 2008; Zimmermann 2012). Migration can 
be considered as a livelihood strategy through 
which people can adapt to constantly changing 
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circumstances (Monsutti 2008). Even wartime 
migration, although associated with disruption 
and loss, is argued to be less disempowering 
than involuntary immobility (Carling 2002).
With regard to return, it is argued that the 
motivation for return defines an important part 
of the post-return experience (Cassarino 2004). 
Cerase (1974) argued that migrants who return 
out of failure will be reabsorbed into society 
as if they had never migrated, while successful 
migrants who return with the ambition to start 
a new life, could potentially be a source of inno-
vation. Although recent studies show a more 
nuanced image, going beyond dichotomies of 
success and failure and taking into account a 
wider variety of migrant profiles, they recog-
nize similar processes (Cassarino 2004; De Bree, 
Davids and De Haas 2010; Cassarino 2014). Sev-
eral authors argue that legal status is an impor-
tant factor that shapes the meanings and moti-
vations of migrants’ return. (Carling 2004; Black 
and Gent 2006). 
Moving Back or Moving Forward?
In the following sections we provide an answer 
to the questions raised above based on the main 
findings from the 2007-2008 comparative study 
and the 2012 Afghan case study. 
Determinants of Post-Return Embeddedness 
We first investigated whether the use of Official 
Development Assistance for ‘Assisted Voluntary 
Return’ programmes of rejected asylum seekers 
and undocumented migrants is justified (i.e. con-
tributing to development) (see Van Houte and 
Davids 2008; Ruben, Van Houte and Davids 2009). 
Based on the 2007/2008 comparative study, we 
analysed the factors that influence post-return 
embeddedness, which is defined as an indi-
vidual’s identification with and participation in 
one or multiple spaces of belonging (Van Houte 
and Davids 2008; Ruben, Van Houte and Davids 
2009), including return assistance, migration 
cycle experiences and individual characteris-
tics. The results highlight the overall difficulties 
for rejected asylum seekers and undocumented 
migrants with regard to building a sustainable 
livelihood, establishing social networks and hav-
ing a sense of identity and belonging in the coun-
try of return. Our data suggests that returnees 
were often worse off in terms of access to inde-
pendent housing and income compared to their 
pre-migration situation.
The process of post-return embeddedness 
is determined by a wide range of factors. The 
study showed context-specific factors as well as 
remarkably strong general trends across the six 
highly heterogeneous countries of return. First, 
the obstacles and opportunities faced by return-
ees are directly related to previous experiences 
in the migration cycle. The living circumstances 
in the host country and the motivation for return 
to the country of origin are of critical importance 
for post-return embeddedness. Years spent in 
restricted circumstances that constrain freedom 
of movement and limit possibilities for employ-
ment and education, thus making migrants 
dependent on social welfare, are factors that 
damage migrants’ self-esteem, survival skills and 
social networks. Their damaging effects cannot 
be compensated by the limited return assistance 
that is provided. Apart from business assistance, 
the return assistance therefore has limited 
or even negative effects on all dimensions of 
embeddedness. 
These findings show that it is unjustified and 
even misleading to suggest that ‘Assisted Volun-
tary Return’ programmes may promote develop-
ment. While the intention is expressed, and bud-
get assigned, to make this type of return migra-
tion contribute to development, this intention is 
undermined by restrictive migration policies. In 
contrast, we found that returnees faced depri-
vation rather than benefits from their migration 
experience. As achieving sustainable return for 
the individual returnee is thus already a chal-
lenge, returnees cannot be expected to contrib-
ute to development. Rather, the opposite is true; 
returnees are often a burden on their relatives’ 
household budgets and put higher pressure on 
already limited employment, health care and 
education facilities in the country of return. 
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Meanings and Motivations of Return
Here we focus on the 2012 Afghan case study. 
First, the findings that return motivation, more 
than return assistance, is of crucial importance 
for post-return embeddedness, which called for 
a more thorough analysis of the meanings and 
motivations of return. In policy terms, return is 
called voluntary as long as it does not take place 
with physical force. We proposed to deconstruct 
return as a complex decision-making process to 
find an alternative for this unsatisfactory ter-
minology. A better understanding of the mean-
ings and motivations of return can help to bet-
ter address the needs and potential of returnees 
through improved policies.
We took a closer look at the mechanisms that 
decide how much agency people have over their 
migration decision by taking into account struc-
ture, desires, capacities and agency of migrants 
concerning their decision to return. We found 
that there is no clear-cut boundary, but rather 
a gradual scale from voluntary to involuntary 
return (see also Monsutti 2008), and that almost 
all migrants could claim some degree of agency 
over their return. 
The analysis, furthermore, shows that mobil-
ity entails an essential capacity and desire in the 
lives of return migrants, leading to strong empiri-
cal differences in the post-return experiences 
of those who are transnationally mobile after 
return and those who are not. Returnees who 
were unable to match desires of mobility with 
their capacities, because of their lack of legal sta-
tus in the former host country and stricter migra-
tion policies, experienced involuntary immobility 
(Carling 2002). On the contrary, returnees who 
had permanent legal status in the host country 
returned while knowing that they would be able 
to re-emigrate if needed. This continued trans-
national mobility gave these returnees a sense of 
security and comfort, and allowed them to take 
advantage of geographical differences (Carling 
2002). 
We therefore challenge the current policy-
oriented categories based on the use of force by 
defining the same categories in a more adequate 
and meaningful way. While pleading to take into 
account the complexities of return, a distinction 
that captures the large empirical differences in 
the post-return experience, which is therefore 
more relevant for policy and research on migra-
tion, should be based on post-return mobility. 
Practically, this categorization is based on legal 
status in the host country: return of migrants 
with a legal alternative to stay permanently in 
the European country of residence is the basis for 
calling return voluntary, while return of migrants 
without such legal alternative is defined as invol-
untary (see Van Houte, Siegel and Davids, forth-
coming).
Interrogating the Expectations of the 
Characteristics of Return Migrants
This categorization was used to interrogate the 
expectations of the characteristics of return 
migrants, which inform the debate on the linkages 
between migration, development and peace-
building. First, other than the assumptions that 
underlie migration and development policies, 
we showed that not all migrants are élites, not 
all returnees benefit from their migration expe-
rience and not all strongly participated in and 
identify with multiple places of belonging. Rather, 
the opportunities migrants have to accumulate 
skills, knowledge and savings in the host country, 
which they may invest after return, are unequally 
distributed among different types of migrants. 
The majority of voluntary returnees in this 
study were members of the Afghan élite. They 
were able to leave their country at an early 
stage of the conflict and, because of their high 
profile, they were often granted refugee status 
and, eventually, citizenship of the country of resi-
dence. These refugees were able to participate 
in the new society of residence and had access 
to education and opportunities to learn the lan-
guage and employment. Voluntary returnees 
returned to Afghanistan when they, given their 
individual circumstances, felt this was the best 
option (Cassarino 2004). They returned while 
maintaining strong and multi-local ties and con-
tinued transnational mobility. 
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Involuntary returnees, on the other hand, 
were of more modest descent and left later or 
stayed in transit countries for several years to 
save money for the rest of the trip; they there-
fore took up to nine years to reach Europe. Hav-
ing arrived in European countries at a later stage, 
they claimed but never received refugee- or per-
manent asylum status. Their legal status did not 
allow them to fully participate in the host society. 
Contrary to voluntary return, involuntary return 
felt like a step back rather than an improvement. 
If involuntary returnees succeed economically, 
this was despite rather than thanks to their time 
abroad. The uneasy feeling of being ‘stuck’ in 
Afghanistan because of their involuntary immo-
bility, and their relative failure compared to suc-
cessful returnees (Carling 2004), made them feel 
impoverished, disempowered and frustrated.
Our findings show that previously existing 
socio-economic differences are reinforced by the 
migration experience, which results in strongly 
differentiated patterns of post-return multi-local 
embeddedness and transnational mobility. This 
finding restricts expectations of return migration 
and development. 
Second, we focused on the expectations 
within the migration, development and peace-
building debate on returnees’ potential to medi-
ate between cultures and negotiate change as a 
result of their multi-local ties and hybrid identi-
ties (Van Houte and Davids, forthcoming/b). We 
explored how Afghan migrants returning from 
European countries negotiated belonging to one 
or multiple spaces of belonging through their 
expressions and practices of marriage, sexuality 
and gender norms.
While the migration experiences strongly 
determined returnees’ capacities, returnees 
also displayed a variety of desires. The findings 
show that all returnees can be seen as agents in 
an attempt to match their desires and capacities, 
although agency takes place through a variety of 
strategies. Involuntary returnees often choose 
to comply with the limits of the structures they 
are confronted with. Voluntary returnees, on the 
other hand, are embedded in multiple structures 
between which they are transnationally mobile. 
This means that they have increased room to 
manoeuvre, and can form hybrid identities, 
which allows them to apply creative responses 
to new situations in their personal lives (see also 
Bakewell 2008). 
Despite the fact that all returnees can display 
agency over their personal choices, they do not 
always want to, are not always able to, or do 
not feel the need to mediate between cultures 
and negotiate structural change in Afghan soci-
ety. The expectation that returned migrants can 
mediate between cultures and negotiate change 
in existing structures (Sørensen, Van Hear and 
Engberg-Pedersen 2002) is therefore overstated 
and should be carefully formulated in policies on 
migration and development. 
Return Migrants’ Potential to be Agents of 
Change
Last, we explore the expectation that return 
migrants can be agents of change in develop-
ment and peace-building (see Van Houte, forth-
coming). We built on the previous findings to 
answer the main question. We took an emic per-
spective to explore the ways returnees identify 
with the conflict and what kind of ‘change’ they 
could potentially bring in the migration-develop-
ment-peace-building nexus. 
The only returnees who could potentially live 
up to any of the expectations raised in the migra-
tion, development and peace-building debate 
are voluntary returnees. They return while main-
taining ties with the European country of resi-
dence. Their participation in and identification 
with multiple places of belonging (in the country 
of origin, the European country of residence and, 
often, the international expatriate community) 
and transnational mobility gave them the confi-
dence that they could protect themselves from 
generalized violence and at the same time keep 
their dependants safe in the Western country of 
residence. While ethnic or other pre-migration 
security issues were remarkably absent in their 
narratives of security, their strong affiliation 
with the West and their sometimes high profiles 
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as successful returnees created a risk for them, 
both with regard to common criminality and 
kidnapping, and targeted anti-Western violence. 
Younger voluntary returnees found a sense of 
belonging in the Afghan society by taking that 
risk and are pioneers who take advantage of the 
opportunities of a market with limited compe-
tition because of the physical and financial risk 
involved. 
Many voluntary returnees were driven by 
ambition and chose to return to Afghanistan 
despite the expected post-2014 turbulence. 
They returned with optimism, energy and pro-
active attitudes, which was a new input into the 
conflict-ridden Afghan society. They adopted a 
discourse of modernization in which they saw 
their knowledge, skills and attitudes from Europe 
as an asset they could offer to Afghanistan. How-
ever, although they tried to negotiate in-between 
practices of Western modernity in an Afghan 
context, any ‘foreign’ ideas were regarded sus-
piciously. Implementing them required patience 
and social skills, which made few of these efforts 
to change existing structures successful. Vol-
untary returnees constantly re-evaluated their 
decision to stay or move, and they were likely to 
re-emigrate in the face of the post-2014 changes. 
However, this very mobility also enabled them to 
take the risk to be ‘different’ from dominant soci-
ety, and to advocate controversial opinions that 
go against the current discourse, through creativ-
ity, innovation and improvisation, as Hammond 
(1999) defined social change.
In contrast, involuntary returnees, who 
returned without having any legal alternative to 
stay, were in no way a potential to Afghan peace-
building and development. Most of them were of 
modest background and returned further impov-
erished and frustrated rather than enriched 
by their migration experience (see Van Houte, 
Siegel and Davids 2014). Being weakly embed-
ded in Afghanistan and involuntarily immobile, 
involuntary returnees felt exposed to generalized 
violence, as they did not have enough means to 
protect themselves and their dependants. How-
ever, their lower profile made them less of a tar-
get of violence compared to voluntary returnees. 
Having lived but never really participated in the 
former host country, they did not pick up many 
skills or ideas and rather leaned to the conserva-
tive and traditional side as a strategy to negotiate 
belonging to the Afghan society (see Van Houte 
and Davids, forthcoming/b). Having lived in con-
stant insecurity for much of their lives, the expec-
tation of increased insecurity after 2014 affected 
their mental health. Being unable to maintain 
ties with the host country in addition to their lack 
of embeddedness in the Afghan space, further-
more, made them angry and disappointed which 
compelled them to retreat from, rather than 
bring change in society.
Two main conclusions can be drawn from 
these results. First, more than economic impacts, 
the human dimension of returnees’ involve-
ment in the country of origin is the most impor-
tant potential contribution to change. Voluntary 
returnees’ creativity, resilience and innovative-
ness, along with their entrepreneurial mentality 
and their intellectual skills, are important input 
by these returnees. Nevertheless, these aspects 
are relational and have proven to be extremely 
difficult to negotiate change in a society that is 
suspicious of returnees and ‘foreign’ involve-
ment. In contrast, the human dimension of 
returnees who are impoverished and frustrated 
by their migration experience, and the role of 
the Afghan government and their European host 
country, can also have a negative impact. This 
negatively feeds the already present anti-West-
ern sentiments in their return environment. 
Second, while the international community 
sees repatriation as the ultimate proof of peace 
that represents the restoring of normalcy, it is 
rather continued transnational mobility that 
could be the basis for Afghan migrants’ contri-
bution to change in Afghanistan (Black and Gent 
2006; Monsutti 2008). There is no such thing as 
a return to ‘normalcy’ in the context of Afghani-
stan, as the conflict and migration movements 
over the last 35 years have shaped the reality of 
today (Monsutti 2008). In the explosive environ-
ment of today’s Afghanistan, continued transna-
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tional mobility has become a strategy of migrants 
to become more independent from national 
structural constraints and ensure their own 
safety. Transnational mobility is, therefore, their 
strongest asset to overcome their constraints 
and carefully negotiate change; rather than a 
weakness, their mobility is therefore their stron-
gest asset that may facilitate their most valuable 
contribution. Policies aimed at stimulating the 
migration-development-peace-building nexus 
should therefore release the focus on putting 
migrants ‘back in their place’ (Bakewell 2008). 
Conclusions
Return is neither a movement back to normal nor 
is it easily a movement forward to change. When 
migrants return to their country of origin, they 
do not automatically contribute to development 
and peace-building. The relationship between 
migration and development is too complex for 
easy generalizations. Rather, the policy and prac-
tice of migration would benefit from highlighting 
the complexities of migration. By unfolding the 
meanings and motivations of return migration, 
and comparing the experiences of voluntary and 
involuntary returnees, this article identified con-
tradictions in return migration policies. 
First, we highlighted that return is more com-
plex than going ‘home’ and introduced the con-
cept of multidimensional embeddedness as a 
holistic approach to the post-return experience 
of migrants beyond ‘reintegration’. We analysed 
the determinants of post-return embeddedness, 
showing a number of remarkable trends across 
six heterogeneous countries under study. The 
strongest findings showed the limited or even 
negative impact of return assistance, and the sig-
nificance of the migration cycle experience and 
in particular the return motivation.
We therefore first focused on the meanings 
and motivations of return. We deconstructed 
return as a complex decision-making process 
that goes beyond dichotomies of voluntary and 
involuntary mobility. We furthermore high-
lighted the importance of post-return mobility, 
which we proposed to centralize in the study of 
return migration as an indicator for voluntary or 
involuntary return.
Next, we interrogated the expectations of the 
characteristics of return migrants, that returnees 
are (1) positively selected, (2) benefit from their 
migration experience, and (3) form hybrid identi-
ties to negotiate change upon return. We found 
that these expectations are too easily formulated 
and strongly differ between voluntary and invol-
untary return, in which transnational mobility is 
the strongest differentiating factor. The findings 
therefore highlight the limitations of the applica-
bility of return and development policies.
Last, we projected these insights on returnees’ 
identifications with conflict. We highlighted that 
policy makers’ idea that migrants’ actions can 
and should be directed raises ethical and practi-
cal questions. With regard to the main question 
of this article on the circumstances under which 
return migrants are willing and able to contrib-
ute to development and peace-building, we high-
lighted the importance of the human dynamics 
and transnational mobility. 
Overall, this article showed that return migra-
tion is a complex process to which contempo-
rary policy is responding inadequately. Next, 
we discuss the policy implications of these 
conclusions. 
Policy Implications: Humans as Policy 
Instruments?
Return migrants have come to be seen as a 
threefold multi-tool in which their actions and 
movements can be controlled to meet their host 
governments’ overlapping goals. Policies and 
budgets on return migration and development 
are considered as instruments to:
1. Manage, control and regulate the movements 
of migrants who are economically and 
politically superfluous by returning them to 
the country of origin and relieve the burden of 
the host state;
2. Defend domestic security and welfare by 
relieving the burden of immigrants on host 
states while preventing destabilizing effects 
of return migration, which may initiate 
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new migration movements or be otherwise 
harmful for the host society; 
3. Shift the responsibility of development and 
peace-building to migrants and give a positive 
connotation to their return, while controlling 
and preventing the ‘wrong’ kind of change, 
such as revolution, religious-based opposition 
or political unrest, which may be a threat to 
the second goal. 
In order to combine these goals into one policy, 
host governments choose to ignore and blur the 
understanding of the heterogeneity of these 
returnees, who include failed asylum seekers as 
well as high-skilled economic migrants. European 
countries assign substantial parts, if not the bulk 
of their Migration and Development policies that 
are paid out of Official Development Assistance 
budgets, to asylum and immigration policies and 
‘Assisted Voluntary Return’ programmes (ICMPD 
and ECDPM 2013). 
Ineffective Return and Development Policies
While the expectations on which migration and 
development policies are based only count for a 
small minority of returnees, this is not the group 
that is targeted by policy. Though the bulk of 
budgets of policies promoting return, develop-
ment and peace-building go to de facto involun-
tary returnees, they are unable to contribute to 
development in any way. This simple but ironic 
finding is visualized in Figure 2.
Why is this a problem? 
The way migrants are seen as instruments for 
fulfilling the goals of the host state dehumanizes 
them, because it fails to see them as purposive 
actors whose actions are part of dynamic life 
strategies, ambitions, values and visions (Omata 
2013). Governments representing liberal democ-
racies should pay more attention to the individ-
ual lives of people without assuming that they 
can control migration (Skeldon 2008; Castles, De 
Haas and Miller 2014: 318). Rather than being 
used as an instrument for development, migra-
tion should be taken into account as an encom-
passing aspect of development and conflict. If 
migration is to contribute to development and 
security, migration should be facilitated rather 
than contained. 
Both policy makers and civil society organiza-
tions have, however, been pragmatic about the 
mismatch between policy and reality. First, the 
current policy on return migration and develop-
ment is intentionally misguided. Several reports 
have questioned the development potential of 
return assistance programmes (Van Houte and 
De Koning 2008; Frouws and Grimmius 2012). 
However, policy makers have not been respon-
Figure 2.  Development potential and development budget for returnees
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sive to arguments about the limited evidence on 
return and development and the need for careful 
wording and definitions regarding the nature of 
mobility. They are aware that using a vocabulary 
of ‘voluntary return’ and ‘return migration and 
development’ makes it easier to explain a politi-
cally sensitive topic to the public, and that fram-
ing the policy in this way enables them to use 
budgets assigned for development assistance for 
the return of unwanted migrants. For host coun-
try governments, this is a multiple win situation. 
Second, non-governmental organizations 
whose primary goal is the wellbeing of migrants 
have now been incorporated into the migration 
and development discourse. NGOs who became 
involved in return assistance, as a way to ‘do 
something for those who have to return’, now 
have to comply with the terms of the govern-
ments’ return policies in order to receive funding, 
which basically means that they have to produce 
a target number of returnees. While NGOs ori-
ented towards migrants have an image of inde-
pendence in society and among migrants, they 
are in fact implementing government policy for 
removing unwanted migrants. The pressure to 
market their product, in what has been called 
the ‘migration industry’ (Gammeltoft-Hansen 
and Sørensen 2012), leads to claims that they 
contribute to sustainable return or even to 
development. Such claims may, in turn, be used 
by governments to further legitimize their return 
policies.
Expressing these expectations in policy papers, 
statistics and other communications is, however, 
not harmless, as it affects our thinking and debat-
ing about, and communication with, migrants. 
Civil servants in charge of convincing migrants to 
return tend to become frustrated with migrants 
who are not willing to leave. In their optimistic 
frame, migrants who do not cooperate with ‘vol-
untary return’ are unwilling to take responsibil-
ity for their own lives (Kalir 2013) and for the 
development of their ‘home’ country. These 
expectations, raised by both policy makers and 
NGOs, strain communication with migrants 
before return and foster anger and disappoint-
ment among returnees who find that the story 
is not as bright as was presented to them. Their 
discontent may have a destabilizing effect after 
their return, which then undermines the goals of 
migration and development policies.
Undoing the Mismatch
It is therefore both for moral and pragmatic 
reasons that NGOs and policy makers should 
acknowledge the real impact of return pro-
grammes on individual migrants and develop-
ment in the country of origin, and to re-evaluate 
their roles in this process. To undo the mismatch 
between policy and reality, and in order to for-
mulate adequate policies that address the needs 
and potential of returnees, we propose two 
modifications to current policy. First, to avoid 
further conceptual confusion, de facto volun-
tary and involuntary return should be redefined 
into more relevant terms that cover the matter. 
Second, it is time to re-evaluate and disentangle 
the different goals that inform (return) migration 
and development policies. This is displayed in 
Figure 3 and described below. 
Although these goals do have overlaps, they 
imply different needs in relation to return migra-
tion. The first goal to regulate, prevent and 
reduce migration implies the need to remove 
unwanted migrants effectively. Since deporta-
tion is both financially and politically costly and 
ineffective, an effective way is to provide a return 
incentive by means of financial or in-kind com-
pensation. Second, the goal to ensure domestic 
security and welfare implies the need to pre-
vent any destabilizing effects of return through a 
‘safety net’. Both these goals and their needs can 
be met through policies of return assistance for 
unwanted migrants. The third goal to promote 
development and peace-building in the country 
of origin implies the need for an investment in 
human capacity of migrants and continued trans-
national mobility. Policies promoting the devel-
opment and peace-building potential of migrants 
should ensure both needs. 
Considering the discussion above, it becomes 
clear that these goals are not complementary 
New Diversities 16 (2), 2014  Marieke van Houte and Tine Davids
84
but rather serve different needs, call for different 
policies and target different types of migrants. 
While the first two goals aim at putting unwanted 
migrants back in their place, the third goal high-
lights the need for continued transnational 
mobility, which does not even require migrants 
to return. In addition, while the first two goals 
only meet the needs of the destination countries, 
the third goal would mainly favour development 
and peace-building in the countries of origin and 
in the lives of the individual migrants, if they 
would be allowed to increase their capacities 
through rights to employment, education and 
freedom of movement in the host country. 
The different goals and needs therefore imply 
the use of different budgets: if return is to regu-
late migration and ensure domestic security and 
welfare, this is a matter of home affairs and secu-
rity budgets. Only if return occurs under the con-
dition of continued transnational mobility and 
Figure 3.  Disentangling return, development and peace-building goals, needs, policies
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strengthened human capacity, it may meet the 
goals to promote development and peace-build-
ing, which justifies funding from Official Develop-
ment Assistance budgets. 
Migration will always be part of people’s sur-
vival strategies in times of conflict and crisis. 
Instead of trying to manage and contain these 
migration flows, a way forward in the migration 
and development debate should be how we can 
facilitate the resilience and determination of 
people to find a better life. Further policy-ori-
ented research is needed to look into how trans-
national mobility can be fitted better into current 
migration and development policies. 
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